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Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions Involving
Multiple Questions
THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE LAW ON APPEAL.
The problem: Article III, the fountainhead of the federal judicial
power, provides that such power shall extend to "all cases . . . arising
under" the Constitution or laws of the United States. The Act of 1789,
Section 25,' provided for Supreme Court review of state court decisions
involving such questions, and Marshall sustained 2 this section, construing
the "all cases" of Article III as embracing cases from the state courts in-
volving a federal question. In multiple-question cases coming from the
state courts, i. e., cases involving questions of both federal and state law,
the Court early developed a corollary to Section 25, namely, that the Court
will not review a state court decision even though a federal question be
involved (and perhaps decided wrongly by the state court) if the decision
of the state court is based upon a state ground adequate in itself to support
the judgment. Recent attempts by the Court to find the reason for this
"non-federal ground rule" in limitations 3 on its own jurisdiction invite
consideration both of the theoretical basis of the rule and also of its practical
operation.
Murdock v. City of Memphis: Section 25 of the Act of 1789 provided
that in review of state court decisions by the Supreme Court, " . . . no
other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal . . . than
such as . . . immediately respects the before mentioned questions of valid-
ity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions,
or authorities in dispute." 4 In the Act of I867,5 passed shortly after the
close of the Civil War, the above language was omitted, and after several
intimations 6 to the effect that such omission ev idenced an intent 7 on the
part of Congress to give the Supreme Court power to review not only
questions of federal but also of state law in cases appealed from state
courts, the argument was finally made in the historic case of Murdock v.
i. From § 25 of the original Judiciary Act, I STAT. 73, 86 (1789) to the
present section of the Judicial Code, §237(a), 45 STAT. 54 (1928), 28 U. S. C. §344
(1940) the acts defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court have consist-
ently provided for review of state court decisions. See ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM,
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREIIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 851 (1936) (Appendix
A). The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is by the Constitution to be
exercised ". . . both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." U. S. CoNsT. Art. I1, § 2. As a practical
matter the fundamental law regulating this jurisdiction is statutory, although it is
technically conferred by the Constitution. Durousseau v. The United States, 6 Cranch
307 (U. S. 181o). See Comment, Proposed Revision of Federal Qitestion Jurisdiction,
40 ILL. L. REV. 387 (1946).
2. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (U. S. 1821).
3. See text supported by note 31, infra.
4. I STAT. 73, § 25 (1789).
5. 14 STAT. 385 (1867).
6. Stewart v. Kahn, ii Wall. 493, 502 (U. S. 1870); Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12
Wall. 687, 694 (U. S. 1871).
7. In Cortesy v. Territory, 7 N. M. 89, 100, 32 Pac. 504, 508 (1893) the state court
discusses the proposition that Congress by omitting the language of the twenty-fifth
section of the Act of 1789 did not intend to enact affirmatively the thing which the clause
had prohibited, namely Supreme Court review of questions of state law.
(764)
City of Memphis." Although the Court posed for itself the question of
the constitutionality of the Act of 1867, if it were to be given the above
interpretation, the Court never actually considered the problem, since it
read into the Act of 1867 the omitted language of the Act of 1789, Section
25, and held that the existence of a federal question in a state court's rec-
ord was not enough to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to decide non-
federal as well as federal questions. The Court held that the new Act of
1867 enlarged the powers of the Court only to the extent that it gave the
Court authority to look at the opinion of the State court, as well as the
technical record.
Judge Curtis 9 who appeared as amicus curiae, argued that the pres-
ence of a federal question in a state court record on appeal empowered the
Court to decide all the questions in the case, whether federal or non-
federal. The essence of his argument 10 was that constitutionally no dis-
tinction could be drawn between the extent of the judicial power exercisable
by a federal court having original jurisdiction conferred by Congress by
reason of the subject matter of the case, and the extent of that power which
might be exercised by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate
power. Curtis correctly "- made the analogy to the plenary power of the
federal courts on removal of cases from the state courts. Once the federal
court obtains jurisdiction over the case because of the presence of a federal
question on removal, it can decide all the questions in the case, whether
federal or non-federal, which are necessary for final disposition. Curtis
insisted that the power of review of the Supreme Court must be similarly
plenary, namely, that the Court acquires jurisdiction over the case on
appeal from the state courts, and therefore jurisdiction to decide state as
well as federal questions. 2
A majority of the Court rejected this line of argument and found that
the Act of 1867, as construed, was not 13 intended to give the Court power
to review questions of state law. At the same time it announced the
principle of the non-federal ground rule. But it is highly probable, as
one scholar has indicated,1 4 that Congress by the Act of 1867 did intend to
give the Court an expanded appellate power. Anxiety as to the possible
action of state courts after the recently ended Civil War was shown in the
expansion of federal jurisdiction about the same time in other directions:
8. 20 Wall. 590 (U. S. 1874). Justice Miller wrote the majority opinion from
which Clifford, Swaype and Bradley dissented.
9. Even before the Murdock decision judge Curtis had concluded that the Act of
1867 had repealed the twenty-fifth section of the Act of 1789. See his brief set out in
CURTIS, JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 58 (2d ed. 1896) ; Mur-
dock v. City of Memphis, 2o Wall. 590, 602-606 (U. S. 1874).
lO. CuRIS, op. cit. supra note 9 at 52. The Act of 1875, of course, had not been
passed and Curtis naturally made his analogy to removal jurisdiction, which he consid-
ered a form of appellate jurisdiction.
ii. Railroad Company v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 141 (188o) ; Southern Pacific
R. R. Co. v. California. ii8 U. S. 1O9, 112 (I886).
12. Bradley, J. adopted this view in his dissent, 20 Wall. 590, 641 (U. S. 1874):"If we have jurisdiction at all . . . we have jurisdiction of the case, and not merely
of a question in it." Marshall made the same argument in Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
13. Although the Murdock case was decided in a climate of expanding federal
jurisdiction the Court pointed out that with regard to the state courts: "And it is not
lightly to be presumed that Congress acted upon a principle which implies a distrust
of their integrity or of their ability to construe those [state] laws correctly," 2o Wall.
590, 626 (U. S. 1874).
14. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 682 (Rev. ed.
1932). The Act of 1867 was probably intended to protect federal rights against state
court animosities, and it was feared that federal questions might be buried deep in state
court records. See 20 Wall. 590, 605 (U. S. 1874).
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the federal courts were given jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus'
whenever a person was in custody under state or federal authority in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and removal into
the federal system was provided for in cases of the existence of local preju-
dice. 6 Nevertheless, the full impact of the Murdock decision was miti-
gated by the Act of 1875 17 passed two months later, which for the'first
time gave to the Circuit Courts of the United States original jurisdiction
over cases involving a federal question, a development which both Marshall
and Curtis had envisioned. The Court was thus enabled to review matters
which the Murdock case had eliminated from its ken, since in reviewing
decisions of the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court reviews all ques-
tions presented by the record and passed on below.'8
Original and appellate jurisdiction over cases involving multiple ques-
tions: Marshall, with his eye on a statute (such as the Act of 1875) which
might at some later time give the federal courts original jurisdiction in
cases involving a federal question, had stated arguenido in Osborn v. Bank
of United States'0 that when federal jurisdiction exists because of the
existence of a federal question, the federal court may adjudicate every
question involved in the case, even if the court decides the federal question
against the plaintiff or does not decide it at all. 20  The theoretical problem
as to the extent of the power of the federal courts of original jurisdiction
over non-federal questions in multiple-question cases became an actuality
after the passage of the Act of 1875.
Where the basis of federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, there
is no constitutional obstacle to the adjudication by the federal courts of
state questions, since the basis of federal jurisdiction remains, whatever
the nature of the questions involved in the litigation. But where the basis
of federal jurisdiction is the presence of a federal question in the case, it is
the nature of the issues to be determined which determines the power of
the federal courts.2 1  The question is not merely which claims, federal
15. 14 STAT. 385 (1867). Cf. Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43
H.v. L. REv. 345, 359 (1930).
16. I2 STAT. 755 (1863); 14 STAT. 46 (i866); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 2o
Wall. 590, 631 (U. S. 1874).
17. 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
18. Jurisdiction of the federal court having attached, it will adjudicate all points
necessary to a complete disposition of the case including the construction of state stat-
utes and their validity under the state constitution, Michigan Central R. R. v. Powers,
201 U. S. 245, 29, (19o6) ; Greene v. Louisville and Interurban R. R., 244 U. S. 499,
5o8 (1917) ; Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478 (1922). The federal court may decide
the case under the state law without considering the federal question, Siler v. Louis-
ville and Nashville R. R., 213 U. S. 175, Ig (i9o9) ; Chicago, G. W. Ry. v. Kendall,
266 U. S. 94, 97-8 (1924). For example, under § 266 of the Judicial Code, 43 STAT.
938 (1928), 28 U. S. C. § 380 (194o), the jurisdiction of the District Court and of the
Supreme Court on review extends to all questions involved in the case. The Supreme
Court may limit its consideration to the federal question presented, place its decision
entirely upon a question of state law and refuse to pass on the constitutional issues
which the District C6urt decided. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 213 U. S. 175
(i9o9). In fact, the appeal to the Supreme Court may present nothing more than a
pure question of state law because the federal questions were all settled upon a prior
appeal. Gulf Refining Co. v. Fox, 297 U. S. 381 (1936). See RoBmRTsoT & KiaK-
HAM, op. cit. supra note i, § 182; Pogue State Determination of State Law and the
Judicial Code, 41 HARv. L. REv. 623 (1928).
i9. 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (U. S. 1824).
20. Note, Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Obtained Through Existence of a Fed-
eral Question, 4o HARv. L. Rxv. 298 (1926).
21. The effect of Osborn v. Bank of United States, supra note 19, and the Pacific
Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 2 (1885), both decisions in favor of the existence
of federal jurisdiction, was to divert a stream of essentially non-federal litigation to
the federal courts. The stream has since been dammed as respects railroads in 38
and non-federal, may conveniently be joined 22 in the federal courts (a
problem which has engendered great confusion) with respect to a single
set of operative facts, but more fundamentally, has the federal court the
constitutional power to pass on the non-federal claim which is asserted with
the federal claim which is the basis of jurisdiction. 3
This problem of whether a federal court in a non-diversity case has
the power constitutionally to determine a state claim joined with a fed-
eral claim is analogous to the problem of whether the Supreme Court has
the power constitutionally to pass on questions of state law in multiple
question cases in appeals from state courts. At the level of original
jurisdiction the basis for the decision of state questions where federal
jurisdiction is asserted because of the presence of a federal question can
be found in a theory of ancillary 24 jurisdiction or in jurisdiction over the
case and not merely of a question in it. Once the basis of jurisdiction
is determined, then the exercise of this jurisdiction becomes a problem
for intelligent judicial discretion.
2 4
1
At the appellate level a statutory provision has always in terms re-
stricted Supreme Court review to a consideration only of federal questions.
Although the matter has never been directly determined there appears to be
no constitutional prohibition to the decision by the Supreme Court of state
questions in multiple question cases on appeal. In the Murdack case 25
itself, the Court intimated that a grant of power by Congress to the Su-
preme Court to review questions of state law in appeals would be within
Article III, even though the Act of 1867 was not interpreted as having
made that grant.
In general, the distribution of power between the state and federal
judicial systems, as established by the Murdock case has remained. But
it is significant with regard to the power of the Supreme Court to decide
questions of state law that where new questions of state law have arisen
after the decision of the state court, and have been presented to the
Supreme Court pending appeal, the Court has declared that it has the
power in the effective disposition25 of such cases either to decide 2 the
STAT. 804 (1915) 28 U. S. C. § 345 (i94o), and as respects other federal corporations
(except where the United States owns more than one-half of the capital stock) in 43
STAT. 941 (925), 28 U. S. C. §42 (194o).
22. See Note, Scope of Original Federal Jurisdiction Based on a Federal Question,
33 Co. L. REV. 296, 303 (1933) for an analytical discussion of what relationship should
exist between the federal and state questions with regards to a single set of operative
facts to enable the court to pass on the state questions.
23. Hum v. Oursler 289 U. S. 238, 243 (1933) and Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 191 (19o9) stand for the proposition that in view of a substan-
tial federal question the federal court has the power to adjudicate all the questions in
the case. This assumption of jurisdiction is criticized in (Note) 33 COL. L. REv. 296
(933).
24. DoBiE, FEDmzAL JURIsDIcTION AND PRocEDus § 84 (1928). See Silberg, Ancil-
lary Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 12 J. Ajn L. 288 (194i).
24a. Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on; Federal Pro-
cedure, 45 YALE, L. J. 393, 408 (1936).
25. 2o Wall. at 62o. See also St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 21o U. S.
281, 292 (19o8) : "Congress has regulated and limited the appellate jurisdiction of this
court over the state courts . . . [by statute] and our jurisdiction in this respect ex-
tends only to the cases there enumerated, even though a wider jurisdiction might be
permitted by the Constitutional grant of power." Cf. 4o HARv. L. Rnv. 298 (1926).
26. "To do this is not to review, in any proper sense of the term, the decision of
that court upon a non-Federal question, but only to give effect to a matter arising since
its judgment and bearing directly upon the right disposition of the case." Gulf, Colo-
rado & Sante Fe Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503, 507 (1912).
27. Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450 (U. S. 1864). Cf. ROBERTSON AND
IIHAm, op. cit supra note i, § 264.
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f
new questions of state law, or remand 28 the case to the state court as the
appropriate forum for the decision of the new state questions.
Basis of the non-federal ground rule: While the prohibition against
Supreme Court decision of state questions in multiple question cases on
appeal lies in a statutory provision, the basis of the non-federal ground
rule, i. e., the refusal of the Court even to review for the purpose of decid-
ing the federal question a judgment of a state court which rests upon an
adequ~ate state ground is a self-imposed limitation announced originally
in the Murdock case.29 The reason for this rule has rarely been articulated,
but a recent decision of the Court, Herb v. Pitcairn 3o has sought to place
it upon two considerations: first, " . . . in the partitioning of power be-
tween the state and federal judicial systems," and secondly, in "the limita-
tions on our own jurisdiction." I1
As for the first consideration, it is true that the non-federal ground
rule is an instrumentality for the perpetuation of the distribution 3 2 of judi-
28. Missouri ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Commission, 273 U. S. 126
(1927), 40 I-ARv. L. REv. 9o3; Kimball v. Kimball, 174 U. S. 158 (1899).
29. 20 Wall. at 635. The Court promulgated seven propositions pertaining to the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court flowing from its interpretation of the Act
of 1867, propositions six and seven containing the seeds of the non-federal ground
rule. According to proposition six a federal question being present in a state court's
record, "If it was erroneously decided against plaintiff in error, then this court must
further inquire, whether there is any other matter or issue adjudged by the State court,
which is sufficiently broad to maintain the judgment of that court, notwithstanding the
error in deciding the issue raised by the Federal question. If this is found to be the
case, the judgment must be affirmed without inquiring into the soundness of the decision
on such other matter or issue (emphasis added) (This appears to be the first use of
the phrase Federal Question). Proposition seven read: "But if it be found that the
issue raised by the question of Federal law is of such controlling character that its
correct decision is necessary to any final judgment in the case, or that there has been
no decision by the State court of any other matter or issue which is sufficient to main-
tain the judgment of that court without regard to the Federal question, then this court
will reverse the juidgment of the State court, and will either render such judgment here
as the state court should have rendered, or remand the case to that court, as the cir-
cumstances of the case may require." (Emphasis added). Note that the words broad
and necessary establish two of the three criteria developed by the Court to meet the
test of adequacy of the state ground. See text supported by note 52 et seq.
30. 324 U. S. 117 (1945).
31. Id. at 125. The non-federal ground rule exists also because of other reasons.
The Supreme Court's function is to confine all authorities within the limits prescribed
for them by fundamental law, and it ". . . ought certainly to be zealous to restrain
itself within the limits of its own jurisdiction. . . ." Sauer v. City of New York,
206 U. S. 536, 547 (1907). There is always the danger, moreover, that without the
stop-gap effect of the rule, the Court would become the court of last resort for all cases
decided by state 'courts. This consideration was pointed out in the Murdock case, 20
Wall. at 628: "But if when we once get jurisdiction, everything in the case is open to re-
examination, it follows that every case tried in any State court, from that of a justice
of the peace to the highest court of the State, may be brought to this court for final
decision on all the points involved in it." By the Murdock decision, the Court
". .. thereby also saved itself from a heavy increase in what is perhaps the most ob-
scure field for its adjudications, namely, the interpretation of local statutes and local
practices." Frankfurter, Bu siuss of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study
in the Federal Judicial System, 39 HARv. L. REv. 1046, 1049 (1926). But while the ex-
penditure of the time and energies of the Court, and its unfamiliarity with State sys-
tems of law are persuasive practical reasons for the denial of such jurisdiction, it is
suggested that the Court should compromise with its refusal to decide questions of
state law when this is necessary to remedy certain problems of state court evasion of
the mandate of the Supreme Court.
32. Frankfurter, Distriutnion of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CoRe. L. Q. 499 (1928). See literature cited in n. I, 53 YALE L. J. 788
(1944). Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States-A History of the Twentyv-fifth Sectio of the Judiciary Act, 47 Ai. L. REv.
161, at 187 (1913). During the Civil War it was asserted in the Senate of the Con-
cial power established in the Murdock case, and the Court is ever sensitive
to the delicacy 33 of this adjustment. As for the second consideration, the
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court, this was expressed originally
in terms of the "useless and profitless" 34 reversal which would be made by
the Supreme Court in a multiple question case if the state court later
affirmed its prior judgment on the basis of the state ground, after Supreme
Court review. The danger of reviewing a case which might become retro-
actively moot is embodied by the Court in its current rationalization of the
basis of the non-federal ground rule, namely, that the Supreme Court can
not render advisory opinions.35 This attempt to encrust the non-federal
ground rule with a patina of constitutional law dogma is striking in two
respects, since up till now the non-federal ground rule has been considered
merely one of expediency and convenience,36 and because state court eva-
sion of the Supreme Court's mandate in the post-remand period has caused
the Court to review cases in many instances which have become retro-
actively moot, making the Court's opinion, in effect, merely advisory.
While it may be said that the current advisory opinion rationalization
fails analytically to provide a secure foundation for the non-federal ground
rule, it conceptualizes a factor important in federal jurisprudence. As a
matter of politique, the Court will not decide moot cases, nor does it wish
to review a case which may become retroactively moot.3oa' If the state court
reaffirms its prior decision on the basis of the state question in the case,
then the Supreme Court has merely presented its views in a case which
are not determinative of its disposition. Similarly, the Court avoids the
federate States that exercise of federal appellate power over state courts had been a
"monstrous despotism." The decision in the Murdock case was essentially a political
one, Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 264 (1944) (dissenting opinion of Frankfur-
ter, J.).
33. In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 128 (945), the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the state court for clarification of the basis of its decision saying: ". . . it
seems consistent with the respect due the highest courts of states of the Union that
they be asked rather than told what they have intended." The embarrassment which
a state court may feel when asked for clarification is reflected in Minnesota v. National
Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551, 557 (1940). The Supreme Court similarly remanded the case
for the "elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities" in the state court's opinion.
The State court replied: "If we were in error, then assuredly the opportunity to be set
aright should be cheerfully and thankfully accepted." 208 Minn. 607, 6o&, 294
N. W. 230, 231 (1940). The Minnesota court pointed out that three Supreme Court
Justices thought the prior opinion of the court clear in that the state statute was vio-
lative of the state constitution. The State court re-examined the issues it thought it had
determined in its prior opinion and again held that the statute was violative of the
state constitution.
34. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 59o, 635 (U. S. 1874).
35. Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 261 (1943) : "Any determination which
we might make of the Fifth Amendment question would thus leave unaffected the
state court's judgment brought here for review. Our opinion on that subject would be
advisory only, since there is nothing before us on which we could render a decision
that would have any controlling effect on the rights of the pat-ties." (Emphasis added).
In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 at 125-6, the Court reemphasized this view: "Our
only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise
opinions. We are not pernitted to, render an advisory opinion, and if the same judg-
ment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws,
our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion." (Emphasis
added.) But it is the adamant refusal of the Court to pass on any question of state
law which leads to the rendering of what is in effect an advisory opinion when a state
court reaffirms its prior opinion on the basis of a state ground in the post-remand
period.
36. Note, Supreme Court Disposition of State Decisions Involving Non-Federal
Questions, 49 YALE L. J. 1463 (1940).
36a. Ulman and Spears, "Disinissed for Want of a Substantial Federal Question,"
20 B. U. L. REv. 501, 505 (1940).
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decision of constitutional questions which are unnecessary to a determina-
tion of the rights of the parties,37 and refuses to answer questions certified
to it by lower federal courts when it appears that the answers of the
Supreme Court cannot affect the result.38 Any other course would lead
to decisions by the Supreme Court "unrelated to actualities." 39
The non-federal ground rule:4 0 The principle of the non-federal
ground rule was first promulgated in the Murdock case, and has been
amplified by a large body of decisional law since 1874. The principle there
was not used as the test of jurisdiction which it has become, but as a means
of disposing of a case in the Supreme Court which rested upon an ade-
quate state ground.41  Since 1928, the principle has been embodied in
Rule 12 42 of the Supreme Court, which requires of petitioner a prelim-
inary jurisdictional statement before oral argument. 43  Important ques-
tions of procedure and substance present themselves in application of the
non-federal ground rule: (i) when does it appear of record that the deci-
sion of the state court is based upon a state ground? (2) when is a state
37. Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 471 (,944). In a
declaratory judgment proceeding the Supreme Court refused to decide a constitutional
question by anticipating the construction of a state statute by the state court because
that ". . . would be either to decide the question unnecessarily or rest our decision
on the unstable foundation of our own construction of the state statute which the state
court would not be bound to follow." See also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62
(1932). In Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. IOI, l05 (1944) the Supreme
Court issued a mandate directing that the decision in the federal court should be held
until an action for a declaratory ruling had been brought in the state court. According
to Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tomkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 293-5 (1946), this is "neither a desirable nor a practical
solution."
38. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 85 (1943).
39. The vice of advisory opinions has been penetratingly pointed out by Frank-
furter in A Note on Advisory Opinlios, 37 HAav. L. REv. lOO2-3 (1924) : "Since
Reconstruction days, the acutest controversies which have come before our Supreme
Court, . . . cluster around the Commerce Clause and Due Process. . . . The
stuff of these contests are facts, and judgment upon facts. Every tendency to deal
with them abstractedly, to formulate them in terms of sterile legal questions, is bound
to result in sterile conclugions unrelated to actualities."
4o. This analysis is based on RoBERTsoN AND KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note I, c. I5.
41. See note 29 supra.
42. 275 U. S. 603-4 (1928).
43. Rule 12 was amended in 1932 (286 U. S. 62-3), to provide that the statement be
attested by the judge or justice who allows the appeal. In 1936 (297 U. S. 733) the
Rule was further amended to provide that the jurisdictional statement shall include "a
statement of the grounds upon which it is contended that the questions involved are
substantial. . ." The present Rule provides that "the statement shall show
that the nature of the case and the rulings of the court were such as to bring the case
within the jurisdictional provisions relied on and shall cite the cases believed to sustain
jurisdiction." 28 U. S. C. A. following § 354 (Supp. 1946). See Frankfurter and
Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 5936, 51
HARV. L. REv. 577, 583 et seq. (1938). In 1938, 170 of the 347 dismissals since 1928
occurred for want of a substantial federal question. See Ulman and Spears, note 36a
supra..
Recent instances of the application of the non-federal ground rule embodied in
Rule 12 are found in per curiain decisions in New York ex rel. Rogalski v. Martin,
Warden, 320 U. S. 767 (1943) ; Holley v. Lawerence, Warden, 317 U. S. 518 (1943).
The principle of the non-federal ground rule is found in the requirement of Rule 12 that,
"The applicant shall append to the statement a copy of any opinions delivered upon the
rendering of the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed, including earlier opinions
in the same case, or opinions in companion cases, reference to which may be necessary
to ascertain the grounds of the judgment or decree." 297 U. S. 733, 734 (1936). It
was the Murdock decision which first allowed the Supreme Court to look at the state
court's opinion and not merely the technical record.
ground to be considered adequate to support the judgment of the state
court?
i. When is a state court's judgment based upon a state ground? In
a multiple question c.se if the state court decides a federal question, but
does not base its decision upon that ground, then the determination of the
federal question is unnecessary" and of no controlling effect on the case.
The following basic situations exist.45 (a) Where the state court expressly
bases its decision upon two grounds, one federal and one state, the Supreme
Court determines whether the state ground is adequate, and, if so, then
review is precluded.4 6 (b) Where the decision of the state court is placed
solely upon a state ground, but a federal claim was properly asserted, the
failure of the state court to pass upon the federal claim is not conclusive
upon the Supreme Court, which will determine whether the asserted state
ground is adequate; if the Supreme Court finds that the state ground is
not adequate it will review the case.47  (c) Where both state and federal
questions are raised in the state court and the state court delivers no
opinion, there is a presumption that the decision is based upon the state
ground, consistent with the policy of the Court of postponing the adju-
dication of constitutional questions until unavoidable. The Court will not
hazard the guess that the state court based its decision upon the federal
question because "jurisdiction cannot be founded upon surmise."48 But
the Court will determine whether the state ground is adequate, and if it
finds that it is not, then it will assert jurisdiction, for the Court will not
infer that the state court proceeded upon an inadequate state ground.49
Otherwise, it has been pointed out, the only thing necessary to obtain
Supreme Court review would be to raise on the record some point of local
law, however erroneous, and suggest that the state court may have based
its decision thereon. 50 (d) If the state court in terms bases its decision
upon the determination of a federal question, it makes no difference that
the state court, consistently with the record, might have based its decision
upon an adequate state ground.""
2. Adequacy of the state ground. (a) As early as the Murdock case
it was held that the state ground must be broad enough to sustain the
44. De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216 (1888) ; Citizens' Bank v. Board of
Liquidation, 98 U. S. 140 (1878).
. 45. The federal question must be seasonably raised below, and Rule 12 requires
that this be shown. 297 U. S. 733-734 (1936). A ruling by the state court that the
federal question was not raised in the state court properly according to the state sys-
tem of pleading or practice may be regarded by the Supreme Court as binding upon it
and precluding review, but see Cardozo's dissent in Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441,
446 (935). Where federal questions are involved in the state court's' decision they
must be assigned as error according to Supreme Court Rules 9 and 13 (9). See Flour-
noy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 272-273 (944).
46. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207 (935).
47. Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U. S. 672, 672-680 (1913).
48. Lynch v. New York, 293 U. S. 52, 54 (1934): "Where the judgment of the
state court rests upon two grounds, one involving a federal question and the other not,
or if it does not appear upon which of two grounds the judgment was based, and the
ground independent of a federal question is sufficient in itself to sustain it, this Court
will not take jurisdiction. Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Realty Co., 244 U. S.
300 (1917) ; Adams v. Russell, Warden, 229 U. S. 353, 359 (1913).
40. Maguire v. Tyler, 8 Wall. 65o, 665 (U. S. 1869) ; Klinger v. State of Mis-
souri, 13 Wall. 257, 263 (U. S. 1871) ; Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300, 307 (1890).
50. Nielson v. Lagow, 12 How. 98, i1O (U. S. 1851).
51. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 323 U. S. 192, 197 (1944) ; Indiana ex
rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 98-99 (1938).; International Steel & Iron Co. v.
National Surety Co., 297 U. S. 657, 662 (1936) ; Grayson v. Harris, 267 U. S. 352, 358
(1925); St. Louis, 1. M. & S. Ry. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265, 276 (1913).
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judgment of the state court. 2  (b) Also, the state ground must be inde-
pendent of the federal ground, that is, not interwoven 53 with it. In multiple
question cases in which the basis of original federal jurisdiction exists
because of the presence of a federal question, the court has jurisdiction of
the state claims interwoven with the federal question. There is no prob-
lem of joinder of claims here. Supreme Court review of state questions
interwoven with federal questions is similarly without constitutional or
statutory difficulty. Recent applications of the interwoven doctrine at
the appellate level are found in cases where the state ground is based upon
federal decisions. For example, if the state ground is a provision of the
state constitution, but such provision is construed by the state court upon
the exclusive authority of federal cases,5 4 or if the state legislature levies
a tax upon all salaries earned within the state y.hich the state may
constitutionally 55 tax, then an automatic application of the non-federal
ground rule to deny review by the Supreme Court is sterile formalism.
The state ground is not independent of the federal ground, and Supreme
Court review is desirable in that it may result in the overruling of the
federal cases relied upon to support the state ground. (c) A criterion
which was not announced in the Murdock case is that the state ground
must be tenable.56 Elasticity and the response to empiric needs is shown
in the evolution of this criterion by the Court.57  It appears to have had
its origin in the action of the Court in applying to the test of adequacy
of the state ground the doctrine that a federal right is not to be conclu-
sively determined by the findings of fact of a state court where there is no
evidence to support them. As a general rule the findings of fact of state
courts are not disturbed by the Supreme Court on review, but where the
protection of federal rights is concerned there have been inroads on this
doctrine.58
52. Eustis v. Bolles, 15o U. S. 361, 370 (893). See note 29 supra.
53. See note 29 supra.
54. Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U. S. 55, (194o) ; Comment, Federal Courts
Review of State Court's Decision Involving Federal and Non-Federal Questions, 40
Micnc. L. Rav. 84 (1941).
55. Van Cott v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 95 Utah 43, 79 P. 2d 6 (1938), 39
CoL. L. REv. 1043 (1939).
56. "It therefore is within our province to inquire not only whether the right was
denied in express terms, but also whether it was denied in substance and effect, as by
putting forward non-federal grounds of decision that were without any fair or sub-
stantial support." Ward v. Love County, Oklahoma, 253 U. S. I7, 22 (1920) ; Creswill
v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias of Georgia, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912) ; Abie State
Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773 (93i) ; Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286
U. S. 276 (1932) ; Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243
U. S. 257, 164 (1917).
57. The role of procedure in the functioning and development of political institu-
tions has not been given the study it deserves., FRANKFURTER. AND LANDIS, THE Busi-
NESS OF THE SUPREME COURT vi (1927). The interaction between form and substance
in the operation of the non-federal ground rule is illustrative of such a role.
58. The refusal of the Court to review a decision of a state court which rests
upon a state ground is stronger when the state court proceeds upon a matter of fact only.
Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658 (1894). But, "If the Constitution and laws of the
United States are to be enforced, this Court can not accept as final the decision of the
state tribunal as to what are the facts alleged to give rise to the right or to bar the
assertion of it even upon local grounds." Holmes in Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22,
24 (1923). This is an exception to the rule that the Supreme Court does not review
the findings of fact of state courts. Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 300 U. S. 254,
167 n. I5 (1937) ; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188 (1897). Quaere: If the Supreme Court
will review the facts of state court decisions in order to safeguard federal rights why
should it not decide questions of state law? The exceptions to the refusal to review
state findings of fact have been framed as follows. The Supreme Court "will review the
findings of fact by a State court where a federal right has been denied as the result of a
3. Procedural aspects of the non-federal ground rule: In applying the
non-federal ground rule, the Supreme Court has sometimes affirmed 19
the decision of the state court which is based upon an adequate state ground,
and sometimes dismissed 60 the appeal. Since the adoption of Rule 12,
the practice has been to dismiss.
But a special problem arose early which was not solved by a mechan-
ical dismissal of the appeal, although dismissal was the first attack upon
it,61 namely, the problem of ambiguous-record cases. Records from
state courts which are ambiguous on the question of whether a federal or
state ground is the basis of the state court's decision have long vexed the
Court with a dilemma. If the Court asserts jurisdiction it may subject itself
to the danger of violating its canon of refusing to decide questions of state
law and of trespassing upon the domain of the states; but, if the Court dis-
misses the appeal, it may haphazardly renounce federal jurisdiction and
fail to protect federal rights.
While the Court continued to refuse to review ambiguous-record
cases, there grew up concomitantly a line of cases in which supervening
changes in law or fact occurred pending appeal to the Supreme Court,
which made necessary a remand 62 to the state court as the appropriate 63
tribunal for the determination of the new questions. In the disposition
of cases the Court has declared itself to have these powers, since the Court
not only corrects errors in state court decisions which it reviews, but it
may make such disposition of cases as justice requires.64  This practice
of vacating the state court's judgment and remanding the case to the
finding shown by the record to be without evidence to support it; or where a conclu-
sion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make
it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts." Fiske
v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385-6 (1927) ; RoBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note
i, § Ioi. The doctrine that the Supreme Court will determine independently or review
all questions on which a federal right is necessarily dependent was recently affirmed
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 (945) ; United States v. Pink, 315
U. S. 203, 218 (1942). In cases involving the impairment of obligation of contracts
the Court has independently decided state law. Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306
U. S. 535, 538 (1939) ; Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938).
The Court also makes an independent investigation of the evidence in criminal cases
involving questions of due process or equal protection of law when there are alleged
irregularities in the trial which result in conviction. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128,
130 (1940) ; Pierre v. Lousiana, 306 U. S. 354, 358 (1939) ; Note, Supreme Court Re-
view of State Court Findings of Fact, 55 HARv. L. REv. 644 (I942).
59. Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 6oi, 61o, 613 (1913).
6o. Live Oak Water Users' Ass'n v. Railroad Commission of California, 269 U. S.
354, 359 (1926) ; Eustis v. Bolles, I5O U. S. 361, 370 (1893) : "An examination of our
records will show that, in similar cases, this court has sometimes affirmed the judg-
ment of the court below, and sometimes has dismissed the writ of error. This dis-
crepancy may have originated in a difference of views as to the precise scope of the
questions presented. However, that may be, we think that, when we find it unnecessary
to decide any Federal question, and when the state court has based its decision on a
local or state question, our logical course is to dismiss the writ of error."
61. Lynch v. New York, 293 U. S. 52 (934).
62. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 146 (1944) ; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney
Co., 311 U. S. 435, 446 (1940) ; Missouri ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Com-
mission. 273 U. S. 126, 131 (1927) ; Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503,
509 (1912).
63. Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 397 U. S. 266, 274 (1936): "While we have
jurisdiction to decide the question, it is one which may appropriately be left for adjudi-
cation by the courts of New York." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 (1924).
64. For similar treatment of a case coming from a federal court see Langnes v.
Green, 282 U. S. 531, 536 (1931). Cf. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324
U. S. 154, 163 (945), in which appellant incorporated into his brief a new federal ques-
tion not considered in the state court, and emerging as a result of a supervening Su-
preme Court decision. The Court refused to consider this new federal question raised by
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state court for further consideration has been employed also in instances
where the precise nature of the federal question was not clear,6 5 and where
the record failed to show adequately the facts underlying the decision of
the state court. 6
That vacation and remand had been fashioned into a well-edged tool
was further illustrated in Patterson v. Alabama,67 where without any tech-
nical justification the Supreme Court remanded the case because the
Court thought that the state court would like to reconsider its prior opinion
in the light of a Supreme Court decision in a companion case. In Lynch
v. New York 6s there were intimations that the Court had become dissatis-
fied with a mechanical refusal to review in ambiguous-record cases, and
the Court hinted that had petitioner requested a continuance in the Supreme
Court to permit application to the state court for clarification of its remit-
titur, such continuance would have been granted.69  In International Steel
& Iron Co. v. National Surety Co.,70 continuance was granted, re-argument
had in the state court upon the federal question, and after the proceedings
were certified to it the Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction.
The well-edged tool of vacation and remand, thus developed, was bor-
rowed to cut the knot of the ambiguous-record cases in Minnesota v. Na-
tional Tea Ca.7 - The refusal of the Court to dismiss the case, as it usually
had done, when the record of the state court did not show clearly whether
the decision was based upon the due process clause of the state or federal
constitutions evoked considerable comment.7 2  The decision of the Court
brought once again to the foreground the role of the Court as protector
of federal rights and adjuster of the distribution of judicial power between
the parts of our federalism. 73  After remand by the Supreme Court to the
counsel since it thought it would get proper consideration in the state court. 45 Co.. L.
REV.. 648 (1945).
The Court in remanding cases after supervening events pending appeal has been
careful, in line with its refusal to pass on state questions, to point out that such action
is not a review in any sense of the decision of -the state court. State Tax Commission
v. Van Cott, 3o6 U. S. 511, 515 (1939) ; Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 6oo, 607
(1935). As indicated above the Court in Steamship Company v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450
(U. S. 1864) actually decided the new issue presented of whether the statute of the
state passed during appeal conflicted with a Congressional Act.
65. Honeyman v. Hanan, 3oo U. S. x4, 26 (1937).
66. Villa v. Van Shaick, 299 U. S. 152, 155-I56 (1936), per curiam.
67. 294 U. S. 600, 607, 35 COL. L. REv. 941 (1935). Cf. Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U. S. 143, 156 ('944), in which the case was also remanded to the state court to
let it consider the case in the light of the Court's decision in a companion case.
68. 293 U. S. 52 (934).
69. In McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 3o9 U. S. 430 (i94o),
after certiorari had been denied, the Court of Appeals of New York amended its remit-
titur to state that the sole ground of its decision had been that the state tax statute
violated the interstate commerce clause, and thus allowed the Court to take jurisdiction.
280 N. Y. 691, 21 N. E. 2d 199 (1939). In Moorehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,
298 U. S. 587, 603, affirming, 27o N. Y. 233, 200 N. E. 2d 799 (1936), the remittitur
showed, it seems, that the state act was held repugnant to the due process clause of the
state constitution.
70. 297 U. S. 657, 662 (1936).
71. 309 U. S. 551 (1940). Hughes, C. J., Stone and Roberts, JJ., thought the Min-
nesota opinion clear in striking down the tax as violative of the uniformity provision
of the state constitution.
72. Note, 49 YALE L. J., supra note 36; Comment, 40 Micr. L. REV., supra note
54. See Patterson, Federal Review of Ambiguous State Court Decisions-An Oppor-
tunity for Tudicial Centralization, 27 VA. L. REV. 900, 912 (x24I), showing the novelty
of the procedure of remand in ambiguous-record cases and severely condemning it. "It
opened the door for what might possibly be pernicious changes in fundamental forms
of our government."
73. 309 U. S. 551, 557 (1940) : "It is fundamental that the state courts be left free
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally im-
state court for clarification ot its opinion, the Minnesota court concluded
that its prior opinion had been clear in putting the decision upon the
state ground.7 4  Herb v. Pitcairn 75 marks the wholehearted adoption of
this procedure in ambiguous-record cases as a flexible 6 technique in the
intelligent exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
STATE COURT AcTIoN IN THE POST-REMAND PERIOD.
Fuiwtion of the Supreme Court on appeal: The purpose of the
Supreme Court in reviewing state court decisions on appeal is to decide
the federal question in the case,77 and it is axiomatic that the Court accepts
the state court's interpretations of state law s.7  But Supreme Court review
in cases coming from the federal courts is not so limited, as is shown by
the mandates which are issued to state and federal courts.
7 9
portant that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers
to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state
action. Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimina-
tion of the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. Only then
can we ascertain whether or not our jurisdiction to review should be invoked. Only
by that procedure can the responsibility for striking down or upholding state legisla-
tion be fairly placed. For no other course assures that important federal issues . . .
will reach this Court for adjudication; that state courts will not be the final arbiters
of important issues under the federal constitution; and that we will not encroach on
the constitutional jurisdiction of the states. This is not a technical rule nor a ride for
our convenience. It touches the division of authority between state courts and this
Court and is of equal importance to each. Only by such explicitness can the highest
courts of the states and this Court keep within the bounds of their respective jurisdic-
tions." (Emphasis added.)
74. Interestingly enough in the post-remand proceeding counsel exhorted the court
so to write its supplemental opinion that the Court could invoke jurisdiction. The
state court refused this request, National Tea Co. v. State, 2o8 Minn. 607, 608, 294
N. W. 230, 231 (1940), saying, "We think so to do would be both unwise and improper.
Judicial duty does not permit us to shift or avoid the responsibility resting upon us to
exercise our own honest judgments in the 'interpretation of our Constitution' with
finality. Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 257, 253 N. W. lO2, IO4."
75. Dismissal of the case by the lower state court was affirmed by the Illinois
court. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the state court and allowed a con-
tinuance to permit the petitioners to apply to the Illinois court for clarification as to
whether the state court's decision was based on a federal or state ground. 324 U. S.
117 (1945). After the Illinois court made it clear that its decision was based solely
upon a federal ground, the Supreme Court reversed. 325 U. S. 77 (945), 94 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 251 (1946).
76. The clarification "need not be elaborate or formal if it is clear and decisive in
stating whether a federal question, and if so, what federal question, was decided as a
necessary ground for reaching the judgment under review. In proper cases we may
grant counsel's request for continuance for the purpose. In proper cases we will im-
pose the duty of applying for it upon petitioner or appellants upon our own motion."
324 U. S. 117, 128 (1945).
77. See for example the early case of Goodtitle v. Kibbe, i Ala. 463 (1846),
strongly indicating that the Supreme Court's opinion is conclusive only on the points
adjudged by that court.
78. Demorset v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U. S. 36, 49 (1944) (dissent):
"That is a question of New York law on which the New York court has the final say.
It is none of our business-whether we deem that interpretation to be reasonable or
unreasonable, sound or erroneous"' Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R. v. Risty, 276
U. S. 567, 570 (1928) ; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Commission, 255 U. S. 445,
448 (1921).
79. ROBERrSOr AND KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note I, § 389, n. 63. The mandate
of the Supreme Court to a state court recites: "remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the opinion of this Court," while the mandate to a federal court re-
cites: "remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this Court."
14 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 379 (1946) ; Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Guardian Trust Co.,
281 U. S. I (193o). The Supreme Court's mandate incorporates its opinion.
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When the Supreme Court remands the case to the state court, the
latter is revested with complete authority over the case to make a final
disposition of it not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court.
In making a final disposition of the case, the state court has a certain area
of discretion, s0 and new issues which are necessary to the ultimate disposi-
tion of the case may be raised in the post-remand period in the state court.
But if the state court exceeds the legitimate 81 area of discretion it may
by various devices mitigate or even avoid the effect of the mandate of the
Supreme Court.
State court devices for evasion of the inandate of the Supreme Court:
The investigation of the methods by which the state courts have avoided
the effect of the mandate of the Supreme Court has only recently received
attention.8 2 First we shall consider the devices in general, leaving for later
discussion a special form of evasion through the operation of the non-federal
ground rule. The following methods have been used by state courts: (i)
Consideration in the post-remand period of new issues not necessary to an
ultimate disposition of the case, including those which might have been set-
tled prior to Supreme Court review.82 (2) Application of the statute of
limitations.8S (3) Re-examination of the point of state law or reinterpre-
tion of the state statute.85 (4) Invocation of a rule of state procedure
or jurisdiction. 6 (5) Consideration of an alternative state ground to the
8o. Simonson v. Monson, 36 S. D. 245, 251, 153 N. W. 1O2O, 1022 (1915): "This
court not having passed upon such other questions, the federal court, following the rule
laid down in Murdock v. Memphis . . . could not and did not consider them, but left
them to be considered and determined by this court. Full jurisdiction is thus vested
in this court to consider and pass on all questions presented upon this appeal, except
such as have been determined by the former decision of this court and decision of the
federal court."
8i. Hallanan v. Eureka Pipe Line Co., 261 U. S. 393 (1923) (separability of state
tax statute) ; cf. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541 (I933). Schneider Granite Co.
v. Gast Realty & Inv. Co., 269 Mo. 561, 19I S. W. 689 (1917) (state court could re-
mand case to trial court to enter judgment for amount due on front-foot rule after
Supreme Court held area-rule bad in Gast Realty & Inv. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co.,
240 U. S. 55 (i9i6)) ; Kinzell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 33 Idaho i, i9o Pac.
255 (i92o) and cases cited (after decision of'federal question by the Supreme Court
the state court proceeded to decide other errors urged on appeal to state court but not
decided); Schlemmer v. Buffalo &c. Ry. Co., 22o U. S. 590 (1911); Commonwealth
v. Schuylkill Trust Co., 327 Pa. 127, 193 Aft. 638 (I937), aff'd sub noom. Schuylkill
Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U. S. 5o6, 572 (1938).
82. Notes, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1357 (1942), 56 YALE L. J. 574 (947).
83. Gibson v. Chouteau, 50 Mo. 85 (1872) ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 344
Mo. 1238, 131 S. W. 2d 217 (1939), on remand from 305 U. S. 337 (1938). This may
be a case of further action taken by the state court indicated by the Supreme Court.
The state court emphasized the language of the Supreme Court: "We are of the opin-
ion that the ruling was error, and that petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the
law school .of the State University in the absence of other and proper provision for his
legal training within the State." 305 U. S. at 352.
84. Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S. 12 (1920); Coombes v. Getz, 217 Cal. 320, I8
P. 2d 939 (1933).
85. Georgia Po.wer Co. v. Decatur, 181 Ga. 187, 182 S. E. 32 (I935), aff'd sub
nom. Georgia Ry. & El. Co. v. Decatur, 297 U. S. 62o (1936) ; Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 189 Miss. 496, 195 So. 667 (1940) (especially
dissent).
86. Davis v. Packard, 8 Pet. 310, 321 (U. S. 1834) ; Johnson v. Radio Station
WOW, 146 Neb. 429, ig N. W. 2d 853 (I935), 59 HARv. L. REv. 132 (935). In the
Johnson case the Supreme Court (326 U. S. 12o (1945)) reversed a Nebraska decision
and directed the state court to withhold execution on its judgment until the F. C. C.
could pass on a new application for the lease of a radio station. In supplemental pro-
ceedings the state court held that execution of its judgment would issue without refer-
ence to the opinion of the Supreme Court insofar as it was considered by the state
court to concern purely local issues. Yeager, dissenting, indicated that the majority's
opinion might be merely volunteer, and in fact, it has turned out to be academic. Note,
federal question, even where dropped by the parties in the prior litigation8s
(6) Application of the doctrine of the "law of the case". 88 These vhrious
devices immediately raise the question of what possible remedies are avail-
able after such evasion of the mandate of the Supreme Court has taken
place.
Remedies after state court evasion of the mandate of the Supreme
Court: One solution to the problem of evasion by state courts lies in the
statutory power which the Court has possessed since 1789 of proceeding
with an award of execution.8 9 This power was first utilized in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee.90 If in its supplementary proceedings after Supreme
Court review the state court not only technically departs from the mandate
of the Supreme Court, but the state court's action furnishes independent
grounds for appeal,9' then a re-appeal lies.9 2
The use of mandamus would suggest itself even before an award of
execution or re-appeal, but mandamus remains only a theoretical remedy
as far as state 9 3 courts are concerned. The summary nature 9 4 of the
56 YALE L. J. 574, 580, note 28 (1947). The action of the Nebraska court has been
rationalized as an attempt to counteract the great extension of federal jurisdiction em-
bodied in the Supreme Court's opinion. Silving, Analogies Extending and Restricting
Federal Jurisdiction; Erie R. Ca. v. Tompkins and the Law of Conflict, 31 IowA L.
REV. 330 at 352 (1946).
87. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 12 Cal. 2d 549,
86 P. 2d 85 (1939), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 657 (1939). The plaintiff had abandoned
his common-law cause of action as a ground of recovery and based his case solely on
the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The Supreme Court held that there was no viola-
tion of the act.
"The question to be determined then is whether the judgment of the Supreme Court
of the United States precludes a retrial. If that court had been of the view that the
only proceeding consistent with its opinion was the entry of a final judgment for defend-
ant without the right of retrial for plaintiff, it would have been a simple matter to state
its view clearly and unequivocally in its opinion." Id. at 554, 87. (The Supreme
Court had said: "In that view, Scarlett in abandoning his claim under the common-
law rule of negligence abandoned the only possible ground of recovery." 3oo U. S. 471,
475 (1937).) The state court allowed a retrial.
88. Baker v. Hartford Ins. Co., 279 Mo. 316, 214 S. W. 207 (1919) (Determina-
tion by the Supreme Court of the two federal questions in the case as the "law of the
case" did not extend to the effect of the state tax law or contractual relations between
the parties not embraced within the Supreme Court decision, nor within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court).
89. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, I STAT. 25 (1789) provided"... the Su-
preme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision as before provided,
may at their discretion, if the cause shall have been. once remanded before, proceed to a
final decision of the same, and award execution." The present provision, 43 STAT. 937
(1928), 28 U. S. C. § 344(a) (1940) reads: "The Supreme Court may reverse, modify,
or affirm the judgment or decree of such State Court, and may, in its discretion award
execution or remand the cause to the court from which it was removed by appeal.'
(Emphasis added.)
go. I Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816). The Court refused to go to the extreme of issuing
mandamus to the Virginia Court of Appeals, but exercised the rights expressly given
to it by the Judiciary Act of issuing its mandate directly to the inferior district court
of Virginia. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 448 (U. S. 1824); Tyler v. Magwire, 17
Wall. 253 (U. S. 1872) ; Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U. S. 248, 255 (1880). See WAR-
REN, op. cit. supra note 32.
gi. Georgia Ry. & El. Co. v. Decatur, 297 U. S. 62o, 623 (1936), 49 HARv. L.
REv. 838 (1936). Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 279 et seq. (1896).
92. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U. S. 129 (1921); Boskey, Appeals
from State Courts, 30 VA. L. REV. 57, 70-1 (943).
93. Nothing will excuse compliance by a federal court with the mandate of the
Supreme Court, where the mandate leaves nothing to the discretion of the court, In re
Blake, 175 U. S. 114 (1899) ; HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REEIES (3rd ed. 1896)
227 et seq.
94. Perkins v. Fourniquet, 14 How. 328, 330 (U. S. 1852). But cf. Ex parte
Texas, 315 U. S. 8, 14 (1942) (86 L. Ed. 579 for a summary of the briefs), in which
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procedure renders it inappropriate with respect to the courts of another
jurisdiction. 5 Still other potential remedies are prosecution of the recal-
citrant state court judges,9" a motion to clarify the mandate of the Supreme
Court,97 or remand to the state court with directions to enter a specific
judgment.
9 8
Methods of prevention of state court eva-ion of the mandate of the
Supreme Court: Clarity and explicitness 91 in both state and Supreme
Court opinions will have a prophylactic o10 effect with regard to the
problem 01 of state court evasion in the post-remand period. Clarity in
state court opinions would prevent re-interpretation of the point of state
law decided in the state court's prior opinion. If the holding by the state
court is what the Supreme Court interprets it to be, then abandonment
by the state court in the post-remand period of this holding will be a more
daring venture; if the holding is what the state court later says it is, then
the Supreme Court will not review under the non-federal ground rule
since the state court's decision is based on an adequate state ground.
Clarity in state court opinions will solve at the outset the problem
of the ambiguous-record cases, and avoid the embarrassment involved when
the Supreme Court remands to the state court for clarification of the state
court's opinion or amendment of its remittitur. 10 2
As for the opinion of the Supreme Court itself, clarity here will make
the state court more hesitant in attempting to avoid the effect of the man-
date of the Supreme Court. The Court should make frequent use of the
device of indicating what state issues remain to be settled, 08 and in grant-
a motion by the Attorney General for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus
against the justices of the Supreme Court of Texas to bring a judgment of that court
into conformity with the mandate of the Supreme Court was denied, but not on the
ground of power of the Supreme Court to grant it. In re Blake, 175 U. S. 114 (1899)
should perhaps not be read too broadly since there the judgment was final and could
have been reviewed on writ of error. The specific instances in which the Court has
the power today to issue writs of mandamus are listed in 28 U. S. C. § 342 (1940)
and the argument of expressio unius may be available.
95: In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, i Wheat. 304 (U. S. i816), Story did not think
it necessary to answer the question of whether mandamus would lie to control the Vir-
ginia court; compare Johnson's dissent at 376.
96. 56 YALE L. J. 574, 58o (1947).
97. Boskey, supra note 92.
98. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 279 (1896).
99. See note 73 supra.
1oo. Note, 55 HAv. L. REv. 1357, 1364 (ig4).
lol. In Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 879, 22 N. W. 2d 136, 139 (1946), the state
court thought that the Supreme Court had misconstrued its prior opinion and "assumed
a proposition of law contrary to the holding in the case." But the state court admitted
that an ambiguity existed in its prior opinion. In Georgia Power Co. v. City of Deca-
tur, 181 Ga. 187, i89, 182 S. E. 32, 33 (1935) the state court pointed out that with refer-
ence to its prior opinion "We did not mean to so construe our state statutes . . .
notwithstanding our opinion was so unhappily written as to open to such construction"
[as the Supreme Court put upon it].
102. In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 127 (1945), the Supreme Court in re-
manding the case for clarification to the Minnesota court said: "It is no criticism of
a state court that we are unable to say in a case where both state and federal questions
are presented, discussed, and perhaps decided, that the judgment would have been the
same had only one of the grounds been present. Those courts may adjudicate both
kinds of questions and because it is not necessary to their functions to make a sharp
separation of the two their discussion is often interlaced." But the Minnesota court
was ungracious in making its clarification, note 33 supra,
1O3. In Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U. S. 449 (1930) the Supreme Court
reversed the Supreme Court of Nebraska and corrected its interpretation of a fed-
eral treaty, but explicitly left open for further proceedings under state law a state
ing applications for clarification of its opinion.10 4  Such explicitness in the
opinions of the Supreme Court will help eliminate another potential source
of evasion, namely, so-called interpretation by the state courts of the man-
date of the Supreme Court.10 5
Finally, the extreme remedy of decision by the Supreme Court of
questions of state law in cases on appeal to prevent evasion by the state
courts is desirable, especially where latent state issues are present which
the Court suspects may be used by the state court later as a means of eva-
sion of the mandate. We postpone discussion of this remedy till after a
discussion of a special type of potential evasion.
STATE COURT EvASION OF THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREMIE COURT
THROUGH OPERATION OF THE NON-FEDERAL GROUND RULE.
Implicit in the mechanisms of the operation of the non-federal ground
rule is a type of potential evasion by a state court which represents an area
of the acutest friction in the functioning of our dual system of courts. Take
the case ex hypothesi10 6 where the state court's decision is expressly based
upon a federal and a state ground. The Supreme Court, considering that
the state ground (for example a local rule of procedure or jurisdiction) is
not adequate and merely asserted as a pretext to avoid the decision of a
federal question asserts jurisdiction, reverses and remands to the state
court. In supplementary proceedings in the post-remand period, the state
court re-affirms its former judgment on the basis of the state ground,
respectfully announcing that it is the final arbiter of matters of state law. 07
A conflict is clearly presented between the doctrine that the Supreme Court
homestead question. In supplemental proceedings, sub noin. Engen v. Union State
Bank of Harvard, 121 Neb. 257, 236 N. W. 740 (1930 ; cert. denied, 284 U. S. 655
(i931), the state court decided this state question.
io4. Railroad Commission of Texas v. R. Owen & Nichols Co., 311 U. S. 614
(1940).
105. 14 Gao. WAsH. L. REV. 379 (1946); cf. The Sabine, 5o Fed. 215 (C. C. E.
D. La. I88i). There may be a legitimate area for interpretation by the state court of
the Supreme Court's mandate. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. v. McWhirter, i55 Ky. 301, I59
S. W. 796 (913), on remand from 229 U. S. 265 (1913).
io6. In Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 22 N. W. 2d 136 (1946), 56 YALE L. J. 574
(1947), after the Nebraska court denied petitioner's application for habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the allegations showed a violation of the
due process clause sufficient to entitle petitioner to a hearing. The Nebraska court
refused petitioner's motion for compliance with the Supreme Court's mandate because
under state procedure the issue of denial of counsel could not be raised in a habeas
corpus proceeding. The Nebraska court thought that the Supreme Court had not
recognized the real basis of the previous state court decision, namely, that under local
procedure petitioner had mistaken his remedy. The court pointed out (at 884, 14) :
"We do not consider our rule denying the use of the writ of habeas corpus under the
circumstances here to be either not substantial or not sufficient. We find nothing in
the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the instant case indicating
that it considers such grounds to be insubstantial. . . . Our action in again stating
an independent state ground as a basis of our decision, and in refusing to grant the
motion of petitioner is not without precedent [cases]." (Emphasis added.) This
appears to be the closest case so far to the hypothetical case suggested in the text. Cf.
White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 764 (i945).
107. The Nebraska court took this position in Johnson v. Radio Station WOW,
I46 Neb. 429, 433, ig N. W. 2d 853, 855: "We respectfully assert that the Supreme
Court of the United States cannot properly supervise or interfere with the exercise of
the power of the state courts within their exclusive fields and thus infringe upon the
authority of the states or destroy the independence of its courts. Consequently, the
attempt of that court to do so will be treated as advisory and not mandatory by this
court."
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is the final judge of the adequacy of the state ground upon which the
decision of a state court is based, and the doctrine that the state court is
the ultimate arbiter of questions of state law.
Paradoxically enough it is the adamant refusal of the Supreme Court
to decide questions of state law which leads to evasion of its mandate in
the post-remand period. If the Court decided all the questions in a case
on appeal, whether federal or non-federal, there could be no resting of the
state court's decision upon a state ground in the post-remand period. The
solution of some of the problems of evasion of the mandate of the Supreme
Court by state courts in the post-remand period, such as the assertion of a
latent ground in state law, lies in decision by the Supreme Court of
questions of state law.10  With regard to the solution of evasion through
the mechanism of the non-federal ground rule, decision by the Supreme
Court of state questions appears imperative since the other remedies sug-
gested above will probably prove ineffective. 0 9
Actually, decision by the Supreme Court of state questions in mul-
tiple question cases on appeal as a means for the prevention or remedy of
state court evasion of its mandate should not be startling. The Court
has in effect been deciding questions of state law since the Murdock deci-
sion. Although the states are to be left free to interpret questions of state
law, the Court has declared that the question of whether the state court's
decision is based upon an adequate state ground is itself a federal" 0 ques-
tion, to be decided by the Court. But this is nothing but a mere verbalism
to describe what the Court does here in terms other than the decision by
the Supreme Court of state questions.
Despite certain trends today towards restriction of federal jurisdic-
tion, 11 and a tendency to leave the determination of questions of state law
to the state courts,132 the solution of problems of state court evasion of the
mandate of the Supreme Court, and particularly the non-federal ground
rule problem, demands that the prohibition against the decision by the
Court of state questions established by the Murdock case be modified. The
Murdock case could be overruled or reinterpreted; section 237 of the
Judicial Code could be reinterpreted or amended."8
One hundred years of Swift v. Tyion 1 4 demonstrated some of the
difficulties " 5 inherent in the decision by federal courts of questions of state
io8. Suggested in 55 HA v. L. REv. 1357, 1367 (1942) and 56 YALE L. J. 574, 58i
(1946) as a remedy for general problems of state court evasion.
io9. Comment, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to Issue Mandamus to a State
Court, 20 TEx. L. REv. 358, 361-5 (1942). Conceptually, the answer to this problem
of conflict between two judicial systems is in terms of the Supremacy clause. Such a
solution in terms of the supremacy of a written constitution is not unique with our fed-
eralism, WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 57 et seq. (1946), and is dictated by the ulti-
mate responsibility of the Supreme Court to be the protector of federally created rights.
1Io. Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Honeyman v. Hanan,
300 U. S. 14, 18 (1937) ; Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Penna., 296 U. S. 113, 121 (1935);
Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 447 (1900). Cf. Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct
at 66o (1947).
iii. Note, Recent Supreme Court Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 53 YALE
L. J. 788 (1944).
112. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
113. Overruling the Murdock case is attackable on the ground that the Supreme
Court should leave the principles concerning the distribution of judicial power between
state and federal courts to Congress. Note, 53 YAr L. J. 788, 795 (1944).
14. I6 Pet. i (U. S. 1842).
115. See Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, nn. 7, 9, io (1938) ; POGUE, op.
cit. supra note 18 at 628 et seq.: (i) variations in rights with the choice of state or
federal forum, (2) lack of expertness of the Supreme Court regarding state systems
law at the level of original jurisdiction. But the problems of determining
state law at the levels of original and appellate jurisdiction do not neces-
sarily require the same treatment. Despite the restrictions of the Erie
doctrine in cases instituted in the federal courts, similar restrictions are not
required in cases on appeal from state courts.
One of the most serious difficulties present when federal courts of orig-
inal jurisdiction decide questions of state law is the possible variation in
the substantive rights of the parties with the choice of either the federal
or state forum. This difficulty is absent on appeals to the United States
Supreme Court from state courts. Moreover, even under the Erie doc-
trine, there is an area n1a in which the federal judge may pass creatively 116
on questions of state law. In this area the conflicts between local and
national interests find solution in terms of a general-law concept in favor
of the "national demand." 11 At the appellate level an adherence to an even
broader general-law concept is imperative for the protection of federal
rights.
The unyielding restriction upon the Supreme Court's decision of ques-
tions of state law in multiple question cases on appeal, as established by the
Murdock case, should be modified. When necessary, the Court should be
free to solve some of the technical 11s problems of its appellate jurisdiction
by deciding questions of state law for itself. 19
Morris L. Weisberg f
The Absolute Nuisance Theory in Pennsylvania
Liability for the escape of substances from land has long remained a
controversial issue in the law. The typical case arises where one puts his
land to a use having no necessary relation to that land, and, without malice
or negligence on his part, material connected with that use escapes to the
land of another causing damage. Three recognized rules of law applicable
to this situation are (i) the English rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, (2) the
absolute nuisance doctrine, and (3) the Restatement rule.
of law, (3) crowded federal dockets, (4) "States Rights." It is interesting to note
that little protest was raised concerning the passage of the Act of 1875, which resulted
in a great increase in federal jurisdiction as contrasted to the furor raised over review
by the Court under § 25 of the Act of 1789.
5ISa. See Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal
Common Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946), for evidence that where federal rights
are concerned the federal courts still apply "federal common law."
116. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 294-5 (1946), argues strenuously against a me-
chanical acceptance by federal judges of state law as defined by state courts: "Hence
my plea is for freedom for the federal judicial process to be judicial." See also Cole,
Erie v. Tompki-s and the Relationship Between Federal and State Courts, 36 Am.
PoL Sc. REv. 885, 895 (1942).
117. Id. at 297: "But when such conflict occurs, no judicial generality or abstrac-
tion will, or should, reject the national demand. .
118. Flournoy v. Wiener, supra note 35 at 264, Frankfurter dissenting, "But the
duties of this court do not hang on the thread of mere verbalism."
119. The removal of the bar of the Murdock case will give the Court a jurisdic-
tional basis for the determination of questions of state law in multiple question cases
on appeal from state courts. Like the problem of determining state claims which have
been joined with a federal claim in a non-diversity case at the level of original juris-
diction, the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Supreme Court must be in terms of
statesmanlike discretion. See note 24a supra.
t A. B., 1943, LL. B., 1947. University of Pennsylvania; M. A., 1944, Yale Uni-
versity; Note and Legislation Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1946-
1947.
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A Comparison of the Three Rules-The leading English case on this
subject is Rylands v. Fletcher1 which held that one putting his land to an
unnatural use did so at his own peril, and if any substance connected with
such use escaped to the land of another, the former was liable for the
damage incurred thereby without proof of negligence. The courts of
Pennsylvania have repeatedly denounced the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
but in its stead have used what is sometimes known as the absolute nui-
sance doctrine.2  Under this theory the courts impose liability without
fault only where the escape is from land possessed by the defendant onto
land possessed by the plaintiff, whereas the English courts grant recovery
whether or not the respective parties are in possession of the land involved.
Recovery was granted in England where leakage from a water main under
a public street damaged an electric cable; s the courts of Pennsylvania
would refuse damages in such a case.4 Furthermore, while the escape in
Rylands v. Fletcher was in the form of a sudden burst of water from an
artificial lake into the mine of an adjoining landowner, the injury in the
Pennsylvania cases imposing absolute liability are of a more or less con-
tinuous nature. And it has been said that had the water in Rylands v.
Fletcher merely seeped into the mine, liability would have been imposed
by the House of Lords on the theory of nuisance.5 In other words, Rylands
v. Fletcher has merely removed the distinction between a sudden escape
and a continuous escape which distinction the Pennsylvania courts still
recognize. Herein seem to lie the principal distinctions between the two
rules. The Pennsylvania doctrine then would impose liability without
fault in fewer instances than would the English law, and this may be due
to the reluctance of the courts to impose absolute liability in these situa-
tions. This reluctance may be based on the fact that absolute liability con-
notes unlimited liability since by hypothesis there is no orbit of risk to
define the limits of liability as in negligence cases. Nevertheless, assum-
ing that absolute liability is socially justifiable in some instances, it would
seem that the distinctions pointed out above between the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher and that of absolute nuisance are arbitrary. If a limit to liability
is to be defined, it should be based on some fundamental distinction rather
than on a slight variance of facts. However, it can not be said that the
courts of Pennsylvania have reduced the scope of Rylands v. Fletcher since
Pennsylvania cases were decided on the basis of absolute nuisance several
years prior to the date of the former case." The American Law Institute
has refused to recognize these distinctions and has described that type of
conduct imposing absolute liability for unintentional damage from the
escape of substances from land by the term "ultra-hazardous activity".
This rule would impose such liability without regard to whether the escape
is continuous or whether it emanates from the land possessed by one onto
land possessed by another thereby covering the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher and that of absolute nuisance with one rule.7 Therefore, the
i. L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (i868). \
2. Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 3o4 Pa. 583, 156 At. 240 (193); House-
holder v. Quemahoning Coal Co., 272 Pa. 78, 116 At. 40 (1922); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 At. 453 (x886) ; Strawbridge et at. v. City of Phila-
delphia, 2 Penny. 419 (Pa. 1882).
3. Charing Cross Electricity Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co., [1914] 3 K. B. 772
(C. A.), 30 T. L. R. 441.
4. See infra note 33.
5. PROSSER, ToRTs 449 (ig4i).
6. Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (186).
7. RESTATEMNT, 3 ToRTs §§ 519-524 (938) ; RESTATEMENT, 4 TORTS § 822 (939).
common law jurisdictions impose liability without fault for the escape of
substances from land under one theory or another, but such a rule is
unknown to the civil law.8
Character of the Use-The rule of absolute nuisance may be thus gen-
erally stated. If one makes an unnatural use of his land, and substances
connected with such use escape to the land of another causing damage, a
private nuisance exists. Once it is decided there is a nuisance, liability
automatically follows. The existence of such a nuisance, however, does
not necessarily give rise to injunctive relief since the activity causing the
damage may be of great common benefit. In such cases, as for example
where one is trying to enjoin the operation of an electric power and light
plant, the social utilities must be weighed.9 The refusal of the courts to
grant an injunction in some cases clearly indicates the problem with which
they are faced. Such refusal is tantamount to holding that the activity in
itself is not unlawful but of recognized benefit. Nevertheless, the actor
must pay for the damage he causes.
The greatest similarity between the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and
the doctrine of absolute nuisance lies in the concept of unnatural use. As
a general rule it may be said that if one engages in a business on his land
intimately connected. with the character of the land itself, such use is nat-
ural. For example, if coal underlies one's land, the operation of a coal
mine would be a natural use, and, in absence of malice or negligence, no
recovery will be granted under the rule of absolute nuisance for conse-
quential damages to other land arising from the operation of a coal mine.
Consequential damages of this type may be caused by floods washing culm
piles downstream onto the land of another 1 0 or by water or gas flowing
from a mine." But if the water has been artificially impregnated with
some substance not naturally therein such as dyes or chemicals, the conduct
will probably be held to be an unnatural use.'
2
Conversely, if the possessor of land engages in a business thereon
having no necessary relation to the development of that particular land, the
operation of that business constitutes an unnatural use.'8 If smoke or
dust from a coke works not located on coal land drifts onto one's prem-
ises he may recover.' 4 The rule is thus because the land in question need
not have a coke oven thereon in order for that land to realize its full devel-
opment. On the other hand, it was held that a breaker located on coal
land was a natural use of the land.' 5 This does not say that had the
coke oven in the previous case been located on coal land its operation would
have been a natural use because as compared to a breaker, a coke oven is
8. Amos, The Common Law and the Cizil Law in the British Commonwealth of
Nations, 5o HARV. L. REv. 1249, 1271 (1937).
9. Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 AtI. 345 (1924);
Becker v. Lebanon & Myerstown Ry., 188 Pa. 484, 41 Atl. 612 (1898).
io. Harris et al. v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 304 Pa. 550, 156 AtI. 159 (1931);
Hindson v. Markle, 171 Pa. 138, 33 Atl. 74 (1895).
ii. Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 304 Pa. 583, 156 Atl. 240 (1931) ; Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126 (1886) ; Clouse v. Crow, 68 Pa. Super. 248
(1917). The last two cases cited held that although the water as it was pumped from
the mine was acidulous, nevertheless, it was in its natural form and was not any more
a factor of liability than if the water had been pure.
12. McCallum v. Germantown Water Co., 54 Pa. 40 (1867); see Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 155, 6 Atl. 453, 464 (1886).
13. Vautier v. Atlantic Refining Co., 231 Pa. 8, 79 Atl. 814 (1911); Hauck v.
Tidewater Pipe Line Co., Ltd., 153 Pa. 366, 26 AtI. 644 (1893).
14. Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324, 22 Atl. 649 (i8gi) ; Lentz v. Carnegie, 145 Pa.
612, 23 Atl. 219 (1892).
15. Alexander v. Wilkes-Barre Anthracite Coal Co., 254 Pa. I, 98 AtI. 794 (1916);
Harvey v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 2O Pa. 63, 5o AtI. 770 (1902).
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relatively unessential to the development of coal land; coal can be produced
without the use of a coke oven.16  Is this distinction a valid one? It seems
that it is. The line between natural and unnatural use must be drawn
somewhere, and this would seem a logical place to draw it. At any rate,
in situations where the business is located on land other than that from
which the raw material is taken, an unnatural use is held to exist. 7  The
operation of a fertilizer plant,' s a garbage incinerator,19 and on one occasion
even the maintenance of a privy 20 were held to constitute unnatural uses
when odors or drainage escaped to the land of others.
Limitations on the Natural Use Concept-In Pennsylvania, however,
if a corporation is clothed with the power of eminent domain, there will
be no liability without fault for the escape of a substance arising out of an
unnatural use of the land.2 1  But this exception does not apply if the cor-
poration is merely authorized by its charter to engage in a business consti-
tuting an unnatural use without the power of eminent domain. 22  The rule
was probably developed to protect railroads against liability to persons
possessing land along the right of way for smoke damage.
Still, merely putting the land to a natural use will not necessarily
preclude liability under the absolute nuisance theory. If the harm can be
reduced, one may be held liable 2' unless the cost of eliminating Or reduc-
ing the nuisance would render it prohibitive.24  But the point at which
such cost will be deemed so great as to prevent liability is high. To charge
the jury that the defendant is liable unless the injury could have been
avoided by a "small" expenditure, is error.
25
The storage of explosives does not come within the rule of absolute
nuisance in that Pennsylvania, along with the majority of other jurisdic-
16. Campbell v. Bessemer Coke Co., 23 Pa. Super. 374 (I9o3).
17. Gavigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 186 Pa. 604, 4o Atl. 834 (1898) ; Hauck v.
Tidewater Pipe Line Co., Ltd., 153 Pa. 366, 26 Atl. 644 (1893) ; Appeal of Pennsyl-
vania Lead Co., 96 Pa. 116 (1881) ; Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (i86i);
Green v. Sun Co., 32 Pa. Super. 521 (I9o7).
i8. Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizing Co., Ltd., I6o Pa. 209, 28 Atl. 702
(1894).
ig. Siwak v. Borough of Rankin, 72 Pa. Super. 218 (1919).
2o. Briegel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451, ig At. 2O38 (189o) ; Haugh's Appeal,
2O2 Pa. 42 (1882).
21. Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. R., 132 Pa. 304, i9 At. 8I (89o); Pennsylvania
R. R. v. Marchant. 229 Pa. 541, 13 Atl. 69o (1888) ; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Lippincott,
116 Pa. 472, 9 Atl. 871 (1887).
22. Rogers v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 182 Pa. 473, 38 Atl. 399 (1897) ; Well-
iver v. Irondale Electric Light Heat & Power Co., 38 Pa. Super. 26, 32 (1909), "The
business is that which the defendant company was chartered to carry on, it is lawful
and it is conducted on the defendant's own land, but these facts, of themselves, do not
absolve the company of the obligation to so conduct it that a private nuisance shall not
be created by percolation of water brought by artificial means on its premises." Green
v. Sun Co., 32 Pa. Super. 521 (1907). Contra: Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v.
Goldstein, 25 Pa. 246, 17 Atl. 442 (x889).
23. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. v. Pittston Coal Co.. 289 Pa. 492, 137 At.
672 (1927), where defendant was held liable for discharging its mine water so that it
would flow into plaintiff's mine when it was shown that defendant could have reason-
ably gotten rid of his water by another method.
24. .-McCune v. Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 95, 85 At. iioz, iio6
(2913). "The defendant has failed to establish that the injury was unavoidable or that
to prevent it would necessitate such expense as would deprive it of the use of its prop-
erty." See Wahl v. Vetter, 38 Pa. Super. 234, 237 (1909). "Each party has definite
rights to the use and enjoyment of his property, and each must concede something for
the preservation of the other. Where the conflict is irreconcilable, right to use one's
own must prevail, but the owner may do so without compensation only where the re-
sulting damage is not avoidable at all, or where the expense of obviating it would be
practically prohibitory."
25. Pfeiffer v. Brown et al., 165 Pa. 267. 30 Atl. 844 (1895).
tions, holds that the storage of explosives constitutes a nuisance only
if kept in such quantities, in such a place, and in such a manner that harm
is likely to result. But if such storage is found to constitute a nuisance
and harm does result therefrom, liability follows without more.28 In
Tuckachinsky v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. 2 7 the fact that the
storage of explosives was necessary to the operation of a coal mine
was one of the factors considered in determining whether or not a
nuisance existed. But where explosives are concerned, natural use
is a relatively minor consideration in the determination of the exist-
ence of a nuisance, the primary consideration being the risk involved.
On the other hand, it may appear at first blush that the rule governing
explosives is really a phase of negligence law. Nevertheless, it was pointed
out by way of dictum in Forster v. Rogers Bros. 2 that once it was estab-
lished that a nuisance existed, no causal connection between a negligent.
act and the resulting harm need be shown; that is to say, that if it be proved
that the explosives were kept in such a manner that harm was likely to
result, the plaintiff's case is prima facie established, it being presumed, in
absence of testimony to the contrary, that the damage was a proximate
result of such storage. It would seem, however, that this is an applica-
tion of the res ipsa loquitur rule rather than a nuisance rule; still it has
been held that res ipsa loquitur has no application in these situations. 29 Pos-
sibly a more accurate statement would have been that the causal connec-
tion between the harm and the unreasonable manner of storage would be
conclusively presumed.30  Probably the reason that the storage of explo-
sives comes under a rule of its own is that while explosives are inherently
dangerous, the substances involved under the rule of absolute nuisance are
not. However, it seems strange that the law applicable to the storage of
explosives should be more lenient than the doctrine of absolute nuisance.
Necessity for Escape-Another element in imposing liability under
the absolute nuisance theory is escape. It will be remembered that it was
emphasized in Rylands v. Fletcher that one was liable if a substance issuing
from an unnatural use escaped to the land of another.3' There is some
authority in Pennsylvania to the effect that although there is injury to
one's land if there is no entry thereon by any substance whatever, the rule
of absolute nuisance does not apply.3 2  Furthermore, it would seem that
the escape must also be from the' land of the other. This point has not
been squarely decided in Pennsylvania, but from the courts' refusal to
refer to nuisance in cases involving the escape of gas or water from city
mains and denying recovery in absence of negligence, one is led to believe
that since such mains are ordinarily buried under land which the defendant
does not possess, the underlying principle is that the escape must be from
26. Forster v. Rogers, 247 Pa. 54, 93 Atl. 26 (U915) (but in this case defendant
stored the explosives on plaintiff's premises) ; Amsterdam v. E. I Dupont de Nemours,
62 Pa. Super. 314 (1911) ; Kiser v. Kerbaugh, Inc., 40 Pa. Super. 163 (I9O9).
27. 199 Pa. 515, 49 AtI. 3o8 (I9OI).
28. 247 Pa. 54, 6o, 93 Atl. 26, 28 (,915).
29. Amsterdam v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours, 62 Pa. Super. 314 (I916).
30. See 8o A. L. R. 692.
31. L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 339 (i868).
32. Householder v. Quemahoning Coal Co., 272 Pa. 78, II6 Atl. 40 (1922),
Plaintiff, the surface owner of coal land, had an easement for the passag6 of an artesian
well casing through defendant's sub-surface holdings. Defendant damaged the casing,
and plaintiff sued for the loss of his well. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed
and remanded for a finding of negligence.
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land possessed by the defendant in order to come within the rule.
33  This
is not in accord with the cases mentioned above which were decided under
Rylands v. Fletcher.4
Nuisance has been defined as "Anything which causes hurt or damage
to the lands or tenements of another, or interferes with the reasonable use
of the same . . . "85 Therefore it would seem that there would be no
liability under the absolute nuisance theory for causing personal injuries
not connected with one's possession or, enjoyment of realty, and no Penn-
sylvania cases have been found imposing liability for such injury arising
out of the type of conduct in question. It has been held that there was no
liability under the absolute nuisance rule for personal injuries sustained
by one whose horse ran away frightened by a train.38 In another case
damages were refused for accidental death caused by the escape of gas from
a mine while the deceased was working in an adjoining independently
owned mine. 7  These cases were not based on the fact that the injury was
not to realty or interference with the enjoyment thereof,38 but cases in
other jurisdictions have denied recovery on that basis.3 9 These cases
seem to be in accord with the statement in the recent English case, Read v.
Lyons, referring to Rylands v. Fletcher, that "That case, on its facts, related
only to the duty . . . owed to the occupier of other land." 40
The scope of injury to the enjoyment of realty, however, as defined
by the courts is rather broad, including damages to buildings and furni-
ture,41 to crops and other vegetation,4 2 and to springs and wells.
4 3  Other
cases give recovery for illness of occupants of neighboring land caused
by smoke or gases,- for the death of livestock from poisoned wells or
crops, 5 and even for loss of sleep caused by disagreeable odors.46  What
interests the courts will consider to be sufficiently closely related to realty is
a matter of degree, but damages have been refused where there was merely
33. Hartman v. Citizens' Natural Gas Co., 210 Pa. 19, 59 Atl. 315 (19o4) ; Straw-
bridge et al. v. Philadelphia, 2 Penny. 419 (Pa. 1882) ; Allied-Realty Co. v. Philadel-
phia, 95 Pa. Super. 62 (1928) ; Abraham v. Yardum, 64 Pa. Super. 225 (Igi6) ; Zim-
mer v. Philadelphia, 57 Pa. Super. 20 (1914); Morgan v. Duquesne Borough, 29 Pa.
Super. IoO (19o).
34. Northwestern Utilities, Ltd. v. Guarantee Accident Co., Ltd., [i9j6] A. C. io8
(P. C.), 52 T. L. R. 93; Charing Cross Electricity Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co., [1914]
3 K. B. 772 (C. A.), 30 T. L. R. 441.
35. Stokes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 214 Pa. 415, 42o, 63 Atl. 1028, 1030 (19o6).
36. Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. R., 132 Pa. 304, 19 Atl. 81 (189o).
37. Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 304 Pa. 583, 156 Atl. 240 (193I).
38. Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co., stpra note 37 was decided on the basis of
natural use. Mr. Justice Kephart distinguished the case from Rylands v. Fletcher on
this ground. In Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. R., 132 Pa. 304, 19 Atl. 81 (189o) recovery
was refused because the defendant was clothed with the power of eminent domain.
39. Quinn v. Crimmings, 171 Mass. 255, 5o N. E. 624 (1898); Reber v. Illinois
Central R. R., 161 Miss. 885, 138 So. 574 (1932).
40. 62 T. L. R. 646, 653 (H. L. 1946), 95 U. OF PA. L. RrEv. 565 (947).
41. Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 Atl. io65 (I9oA);
Briegel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451, ig Atl. 1038, (189o) ; Green v. Sun Co., 32 Pa.
Super. 521 (1907) ; Campbell v. Bessemer Coke Co., 23 Pa. Super. 374 (1903).
42. McCune v. Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 85 Atl. 11o2 (1913);
Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 Atl. io65 (19o4) ; Pfeiffer v.
Brown et al., 165 Pa. 267, 30 Atl. 844 (1895) ; Lentz v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 612, 23 Atl.
219 (1892) ; Conti v. New Castle Lime & Stone Co., 94 Pa. Super. 321 (1927) ; Camp-
bell v. Bessemer Coke Co., 23 Pa. Super. 374 (193o).
43. Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe Line Co., Ltd., 153 Pa. 366, 26 Atl. 644 (1893);
Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 30 Pa. 257 (i861).
44. Gavigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 186 Pa. 6o4, 4o AtI. 834 (1898) ; Siwak v.
Borough of Rankin, 72 Pa. Super. 218 (1919).
45. Appeal of the Pennsylvania Lead Co., o6 Pa. 116 (1881).
46. Farver v. American Car & Foundry Co., 24 Pa. Super. 579 (1904).
an annoyance to possession or a drop in the market value of the land and
no substantial interference with physical comfort.
4 7
Conclusion--Absolute liability for the escape of substances from land
has without a doubt become a permanent part of our law. To what varied
activities a rule of liability without fault will be applied is the only question
remaining. As we have seen, the absolute nuisance doctrine recognizes
factual distinctions which seem to be without reasonable basis, such as the
necessity of the continuing nature of the injury and the requirement that
the respective parties must be in the possession of the land involved. But
cases of the type under consideration are sui generis in that the basis of
liability is the risk involved rather than the degree of care used as in
negligence law or recurrent injury to realty as in nuisance law. It is sub-
mitted that the use of the Restatement rule will obviate the difficulties, for
until the courts of Pensylvania apply a rule of law specifically designed
to cover these situations, injustices caused by purely legalistic distinctions
will result.
R.M.M.
47. See: Robb v. Carnegie, i45 Pa. 324, 342, 343, 22 At. 649, 65r (1891) ; Penn-
sylvania R. R. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472, 9 At. 871 (i887) semble.
1947] NOT.ES
